49. When a customer migrates to a CLEC, Qwest changes the customer code for that customer. Thus, the customer code the CLEC obtained from the CSR when it submitted its initial order is not the proper customer code when the customer submits a MACD order. Even though the customer is now the CLEC's customer and the CLEC is maintaining its own records for the customer, the CLEC must access Qwest's systems and obtain the new customer code in order to place a MACD order. This adds significantly to the time and expense of placing such orders and to the development cost involved in placing such orders.

50. Moreover, Qwest rejects MACD orders if it has not yet updated the customer's CSR to reflect the fact that the customer is now owned by a CLEC. While other BOCs do this as well, the problem is much more acute in the Qwest region. Qwest has informed WorldCom that it normally takes 5-7 days to update a CSR and can take up to 30 days. That is far too long. Customers frequently request a feature change on their account soon after placing an order, as they change their minds as to what features they desire. CLECs need to be able to submit orders for such a change quickly after submitting the initial orders. WorldCom's reject rate on MACD orders is 29.0%; presumably, much of this is the result of BellSouth's failure to update the CSRs quickly enough. The reject rate should be much lower than on initial orders, because WorldCom has already obtained the customer's address and feature information and successfully submitted it to Qwest on its initial order.

51. AT&T submitted a change request to alter the time frame for updating the CSR to 24 hours. In other BOCs, it typically takes a day or two to update the CSR, not the 5-7 days

it takes in the Qwest region. Nonetheless, Qwest has indicated that it will not accept AT&T change request, meaning that this problem will continue.

Qwest Installation Interval Is Too Long

52. Once CLECs have surmounted the hurdles of Qwest's ordering process, Qwest takes far too long to provision basic orders. A UNE-P order should be completed on the same day that it is sent since all that is involved is a software change. In other regions, the benchmark for UNE-P migration orders is in before 3:00 p.m., completed that same day.

53. But in the Qwest region, unlike other regions, the shortest interval that CLECs can request on a UNE-P migration is three days if the customer is changing any features. This is so even though no dispatch is required on such orders and all that is involved is a translation at the switch. All of WorldCom's Neighborhood Orders involve a feature change; thus, all are subject to the 3 day interval. As I already noted, in other regions, all UNE-P migrations have a 1 day interval

54. During testing, KPMG found that Qwest's performance in installing UNE-P orders was out of parity with its retail performance. KPMG found that Qwest did not install non-dispatch orders for the Pseudo CLEC within a time period in parity with Qwest's retail operations for UNE-P services, Final Test 14-1-36, or business POTS services. Final Test 14-1-34. (Exception 3086 Closed/Unresolved and Exception 3120). Qwest failed both the original test and retests. But the fact is the retail comparison is not what is critical. There is no clear retail analog for a UNE-P migration order except perhaps for a feature change. (It is not clear from Qwest's PIDs, what it is using as a basis for a retail comparison.) What is critical is that Qwest install UNE-P orders quickly.

55. It has long been clear that rapid installation of basic orders is critical to a CLEC's ability to compete effectively. Qwest has not yet shown that it can provide CLECs the ability to offer rapid installation to their customers.

56. Qwest's failure to provision UNE-P orders in a timely manner also emphasizes the importance of improved flow through. It is quite likely that the reason Qwest sets a 3 day interval for UNE-P migration orders is that it manually processes too many of those orders. It is inexplicable that a flow through UNE-P order would take several days to provision. But whatever the cause, it is clear that processing of UNE-P migrations takes far too long.

Qwest Manually Processes Too Many Orders

57. Qwest has not shown that it is capable of processing a high percentage of orders without manual intervention. Nor has Qwest shown that it is capable of effectively processing a high volume with current levels of manual intervention.

58. During the third-party test, flow-through was considered a diagnostic measure only. Thus KPMG did not reach a conclusion as to whether Qwest's flow-through performance was adequate. But KPMG did find a high level of manual handling in Qwest. In particular, KPMG found that only 51.86% of 3,650 order transactions submitted via EDI flow through to the service order processor. Final Test, 13-1-2. (Similarly, only 50.45% of the 331 order transactions submitted via the GUI flowed through to the service order processor).

59. Although Qwest's performance was better for orders designed to flow through, even for these orders, a significant percentage fell out for manual handling during the test -- in contrast to tests in other regions where flow through in such instances was very close to

100%. (KPMG found that more than 15% of UNE-L transactions and more than 5% of UNE-P transactions failed to flow through. Final Test, 13-1-4, 13-1-5. KPMG also found that flow-through eligible transactions are not always processed in accord with documented flow through rules. Final Test, 13.-1-9, 13-1-10.. More important, KPMG did not evaluate what explained the different results between overall flow through and achieved flow through (flow through of orders designed to flow through).

60. It may be that in the overall flow through test, some orders designed to flow through did not do so. Or it may be that the low overall flow through rate was caused by Qwest's failure to design key order types to flow through. For example, *no* supplemental orders to change due dates or features flow through even though such orders are very common. Many cancellation requests do not flow through. Conversions with voice mail rollover, or with telephone number changes (in the Central and Western regions) do not flow through. CLEC to CLEC migrations do not flow through. And it is likely that many other key order types do not flow through, as has become apparent in production in other regions once commercial volumes grew. What is clear, however, is that a 52% flow through rate for EDI orders is far too low.

61. Qwest's commercial experience is even worse than the test results. In April 2002, Qwest flowed through only 57.16% *of UNE-P orders* received via IMA and 53.10% received via EDI region wide (PO-2A-1, PO-2A-2). In May, the numbers were 54.04% for IMA and 67.34% for EDI. In June, only 50.9% of UNE-P orders submitted via EDI flowed through (Performance Results (PO-2A-2)). Moreover, flow-through performance is poor for every CLEC that is submitting a high number of orders. Although Qwest boasts of the high flow-through rates achieved by some CLECs, the highest flow through

percentage for any CLEC that had submitted at least 5,000 LSRs was 76.24% -- not a very high flow through rate for the very best CLEC. July 12 *ex parte* in Qwest I.

62. It is not clear why any significant fraction of UNE-P orders should not flow through. In any event, even with respect to what Qwest considers flow through of eligible LSRs, Qwest's performance was extremely poor. Only 87.11% of eligible LSRs for UNE-P received via IMA flowed through in April and only *81.53%* of eligible orders received via EDI. In May, the numbers were 88.79% for IMA and 85.96% for EDI. In June, only 86.5% even of eligible UNE-P orders flowed through via EDI (Performance Results (PO-2B-2)). And these were orders ostensibly designed to flow through. Although these flow through rates for eligible orders met the very low benchmark that currently exists, they will not meet the still-relatively low benchmark of 90% that will go into effect in July.

63. Qwest's poor flow through performance is almost certain to cause significant problems. Qwest does not have sufficient commercial experience to demonstrate that it is capable of manually processing a high volume of orders. Unlike in other regions, Qwest has not shown that it can process orders manually without difficulty as ordering volumes increase significantly. Indeed, Qwest has not even shown it can do so with low order volumes.

64. The test shows that Qwest's manual processing is far from adequate. KPMG determined that Qwest lacks defined, documented procedures that it adheres to for the processing of orders that do not flow through. Final Test 12.8-2 (due to Observation 3110). As part of a retest of Exception 3120 involving integrity issues with data used for performance measures, KPMG determined that 8 orders unexpectedly fell out for manual handling which should have flowed through. KPMG also looked at a larger data set. KPMG found that 7 of 49 orders that fell out for manual handling were processed incorrectly

resulting in errors that could result in miscalculation of performance measures. Observation 3110. While Qwest suggests that KPMG's finding of seven errors out of 49 orders is a "small level of errors," Notarianni & Doherty Decl. ¶ 331, this error rate is extremely high.

65. Indeed, KPMG found the error rate unacceptable. During the course of evaluating whether Qwest produced measures of pre-order/order performance were consistent with KPMG measures, Final Test 12-11-4, KPMG explained that "[d]ue to human error issues identified in Exception 3120 and Observation 3110 regarding manual processing of data intended for use in PID reporting, KPMG Consulting identified a need for additional retesting. Without further retesting specifically designed to assess the impact of human error on the accuracy of Qwest's PID reporting, KPMG Consulting is unable to conclude that Qwest satisfied this evaluation criterion." Final Test 12-11-4. KPMG reached the same conclusion in evaluating whether Qwest-produced measures of ordering and provisioning results are consistent with KPMG produced measures. Final Test 14-1-44. And in the course of closing Observation 3110 without resolution, KPMG similarly affirmed that the only way to properly address the observation was to conduct a retest that focuses on orders that drop out for manual handling and their impact on performance reporting. Qwest, however, elected not to conduct a retest.

66. Human errors such as the ones found by KPMG would obviously significantly impact the accuracy of performance measures. If Qwest records show that it received an order far later than it actually did receive the order, for example, this would reduce the time Qwest reports for return of notifiers, completion of the order etc. Nonetheless, Qwest elected not to retest its performance on these test criteria.

67. In addition to affecting performance measures, manual processing almost certainly also leads to provisioning errors. Although KPMG eventually conducted retests in which it deemed Qwest's provisioning accuracy acceptable, on several initial tests it found substantial errors. (Final Test 14-1-12 and 14-1-3 to 5). Qwest's ability eventually to pass a retest does not show that it can consistently provision orders accurately – especially in the absence of commercial evidence that Qwest can do so.

68. Thus, as the Department of Justice notes, KPMG found significant errors during testing. DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 20-21. The Department of Justice further concludes that the data that Qwest submitted to show it processes service orders accurately was limited to analysis of a single field (the APP date field). DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 22 n. 97. Qwest subsequently submitted one month of data regarding service order accuracy, but that data actually shows very poor performance – a nearly 10% error rate on POTS resale and UNE-P orders (Perf. Results (PO-20)). This is so even though the measure is currently under development and does not yet include an evaluation of the key fields related to provisioning of features. At present, as calculated by Qwest, the measure only includes 12 fields that are mostly related to the service address. The error rate would likely be much higher if all the fields were included. Even if the results were far better and the measure much more comprehensive, one month of data based on today's very limited order volume would show very little – especially since no one has audited these performance results.

69. In addition, Qwest itself has acknowledged significant manual errors historically. For example, Qwest's own data show that a high percentage of manually processed LSRs are immediately rejected by the Service Delivery Coordinators, indicating a high level of

manual errors. July 12 *ex parte.*[5] Qwest also states that "Liberty's aggregate results demonstrate that 6% of historic unbundled loop orders contain human error" although Qwest states that the errors did not harm CLECs. Qwest July 10 *ex parte* letter, Tab 5. The percentage of manually processed loop orders with errors is presumably much higher than the percentage of all loops with errors. And whether or not these particular errors harmed CLECs, the existence of such a high number of manual errors makes harm to CLECs inevitable. Especially in the absence of reliable, long term, audited data on service order accuracy, there is no basis for concluding that Qwest can perform acceptably with existing levels of manual processing. Certainly, there is no evidence that Qwest can do so with commercial volumes of orders.

70. In addition to provisioning errors and performance reporting errors, it is likely that manual processing led to long intervals for provisioning of orders, as I have discussed above. Qwest's poor flow through performance is thus associated with poor performance in other areas. Its flow through performance must improve.

Order Status Notices

71. As Qwest properly acknowledges, it is vital that an ILEC transmit timely and accurate order notices to CLECs, including firm order confirmations, rejects, jeopardies and completion notices. Qwest is not yet doing so.

Qwest Transmits Jeopardies Requiring Supplementation After FOCs

72. When Qwest rejects an order and requires the CLEC to supplement the order to correct it, Qwest sometimes does so by transmitting a jeopardy notice rather than a reject notice.

[5] Qwest states that its internal data show that it is rare that it manually rejects orders and subsequently issues FOCs. But that is completely meaningless. Even if Qwest rejected an order

WorldCom continues to receive a substantial number of jeopardies that require it to send supplements before Qwest will complete the order. Of the 4028 orders that WorldCom had submitted that had received FOCs as of June 12, WorldCom received 39 jeopardies that required submission of supplements to correct the orders.

73. This is an entirely improper use of a jeopardy notice. A jeopardy is supposed to inform the CLEC that the date for completing the order has changed from what the ILEC originally promised on the FOC. Instead, Qwest is transmitting jeopardies that, for example, inform the CLEC that the address on the order is invalid. An order with an invalid address should be rejected; Qwest should not send a FOC on such an order and then later send a jeopardy showing that the original order was unacceptable. The whole purpose of the FOC is to inform the CLEC that the order is acceptable and will be completed on a certain date.

74. That is why HP originally opened an exception during the test based on Qwest's transmission of rejects after FOCs. Exception 2030, 2031; Test Report Table 12-17. Once a FOC has been transmitted, Qwest should not be sending any order status notice that requires additional work by the CLEC. It should either be sending a jeopardy informing the CLEC that Qwest cannot meet the intended due date or it should be sending a completion notice stating that the order has been completed. It should not be sending either a reject or a jeopardy requiring a supplemental order from the CLEC.

75. Apparently, Qwest's response to HP's exception was to convert the rejects after FOCs into jeopardies after FOCs. Obviously, that does not solve the problem.

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erroneously, it is rare that it would subsequently issue a FOC without the order being supplemented by the CLEC.

76. Transmission of a jeopardy instead of a reject creates substantial difficulty for the CLECs. Z-Tel's systems, for example, were set up based on the premise that rejected orders would have to be corrected, but not jeopardies. They were also set up based on the premise that receipt of a FOC means that the order has been accepted. In order to evaluate jeopardies to determine whether correction of the original order is required, Z-Tel has had to modify its systems. This not only creates unnecessary costs in modifying the systems but causes significant difficulty in tracking order status, as Z-Tel in effect must internally change the jeopardies into rejects to know that it may need to supplement the orders. Moreover, because only some jeopardies require supplemental orders, WorldCom must manually check each jeopardy to see if a supplemental order is required. Further complications are created by the fact that if a CLEC has not corrected an order within 4 hours after a receipt of either a jeopardy or a reject, Qwest will then send a second order status message rejecting the order – leading to duplicative messages in the CLEC systems that must be sorted out.

77. In an *ex parte* filing in the Qwest I proceeding, Qwest attempts to justify transmission of jeopardies after FOCs. Qwest July 10 *ex* parte letter, Tab 6. But most of the reasons Qwest lists explain why Qwest would submit a real jeopardy after a FOC, not why it would transmit a jeopardy that is actually a reject. For example, Qwest says that it will transmit a jeopardy as a result of a customer-caused delay. That is indeed perfectly appropriate, but is irrelevant to the issue at hand since this is not a jeopardy that should be a reject. Qwest does acknowledge that one of the reasons it transmits jeopardies after FOCs is that "[t]he CLEC LSR is not complete and accurate. The Qwest center overlooks the error prior to creating service orders and issuing the FOC. The error is then

detected in provisioning. For example, the CLEC has omitted supplemental address information that is required." *Id.* Indeed, it was for just this type of reason that WorldCom received jeopardies after FOCs. But errors such as address errors should be found before a FOC is transmitted, not afterwards. And a reject, not a jeopardy, should be transmitted for such errors.

78. In its reply comments in the Qwest I proceedings, Qwest appears to acknowledge that Qwest representatives failed to recognize errors on WorldCom orders (submitted by Z-Tel) and submitted them to Qwest's downstream systems with errors included. The errors were later discovered, resulting in transmission of jeopardies. Notariannia & Doherty Qwest I Reply Decl. ¶ 129. Qwest says that its reps were inadequately trained on the version of EDI that WorldCom/Z-Tel were using and that the problem should be resolved when Z-Tel moves to a new version of EDI. But the problem is a process that relies on too much manual handling and that places systems edits at a point in the process after a FOC has already been transmitted.

Qwest Fails To Transmit All Jeopardies

79. In addition to the problem caused by Qwest's transmission of jeopardies when it should not be sending jeopardies, Qwest sometimes fails to submit jeopardies when it should. A jeopardy notification is used to inform the CLEC that the BOC will not complete the order on the date it had promised. Such notification is vital, because the CLEC needs to be able to notify its customer that service will not be turned up on the promised date. SC Order ¶¶ 115, 130.

80. In contrast to BellSouth, Ga/La Order ¶ 156, KPMG found Qwest's ability to provide timely jeopardy notices for resale and for UNE-P to be unsatisfactory. Final Test, 12-9-4,

12-9-5. When KPMG transmitted orders that should have received jeopardies, Qwest did not send the jeopardies at all. Qwest failed to transmit eight jeopardies on resale orders and 11 jeopardies on UNE-P orders. Moreover, because Qwest did not send the jeopardies at all and did not send any other jeopardies during the evaluation period, KPMG was unable to evaluate the timeliness of jeopardy notifications. It could not determine whether Qwest provides jeopardy notices in advance of the due date for resale and for UNE-P as required by PID PO-8. 12-9-1, 12-9-2.

81. Although Qwest touts its commercial experience in providing jeopardies, Notarianni & Doherty Decl. ¶ 282, there has been far too little data to determine if Qwest's performance is adequate. For one thing, if Qwest fails to transmit a jeopardy at all, this would not be captured by the performance measures. For another, Qwest has very little data in the states in which it does report its performance. Region-wide, Qwest claims that it transmitted only 44 jeopardies on UNE-P orders in April and 28 in May, although this is difficult to believe given WorldCom's experience with jeopardies after FOCs. (Performance Measures, PO-8D). Moreover, Qwest's performance for CLECs has been consistently somewhat worse than performance for itself – even assuming that its retail performance is an appropriate measure of parity – and its actual performance results show only 14.29% of CLEC jeopardies returned on time in April and 17.39% in May, hardly performance about which to boast. Qwest's regional performance remained poor in June. (Perf Results (PO-8D)).

82. Thus, there is simply no basis from which to now conclude that Qwest does an acceptable job in transmitting jeopardy notifications.

<u>Qwest Fails To Show It Can Identify More Than One Error at a Time.</u>

83. KPMG did not even attempt to evaluate Qwest's ability to process orders with multiple errors. In production, CLEC sometimes transmit Local Service Requests ("LSRs") with several errors. It is important that when LSRs are returned to the CLEC as rejects, that multiple errors be identified. Handling errors one at a time wastes time and delays processing of the orders. Yet Qwest's ability to identify multiple errors was not tested (with the very limited exception that occurred when the provisioning CLEC accidentally transmitted an LSR with more than one error).

Qwest May Return Completion Notices Even When Orders Have Not Been Completed

84. Qwest's entire process for returning completion notices may be flawed. WorldCom determined that on some DSL orders, Qwest was returning completion notices even when the orders had not been completed. In response to a question from WorldCom, Qwest's answer suggested that this problem may extend to UNE-P. Qwest transmits a work completion notice when the service orders it creates in its back-end have completed. But it appears that the service orders can complete even when provisioning has not been completed. Qwest has said that it "auto-completes" the service orders each day. Such auto-completion may generate a completion notice even if required work has not been performed – such as field work or central office work on a new installation. WorldCom is asking Qwest further questions about its processes.

Maintenance and Repair

85. The third-party test revealed substantial deficiencies in Qwest's performance in repairing troubles on CLEC lines. Once again, however, the test ended before all of these deficiencies had been corrected.

86. Most important, KPMG determined that Qwest's performance in repairing troubles was unsatisfactory. Final Test 18-7-1 (due to closed/unresolved on Exception 3058). KPMG was able directly to observe whether troubles were fixed and concluded that Qwest was only able to fix 92% of troubles on the first try. This is a very poor record and has a substantial impact on customers. Failure to repair troubles also harms CLECs by causing extreme dissatisfaction from customers.

87. Although Qwest indicates that it is performing acceptably on the PID for repeat troubles within 30 days, Notarianni & Doherty Decl. ¶ 461, as KPMG explained at the June 20 ROC meeting with Commission staff, that is a second best measure that depends on reported troubles. KPMG was able to directly evaluate whether troubles were fixed on the first try and found that far too many were not. Yet Qwest has not taken any steps to address this problem. And KPMG did not conduct a retest. Without a retest, there is no basis to conclude that KPMG's repair rate is acceptable.

88. This is especially so because Qwest's performance reports do not in fact demonstrate pristine performance. Amazingly, when no dispatch was required, the repeat trouble rate on CLEC UNE-P customers region-wide was more than 20% in February and April, more than 17% in March, more than 15% in May, and more than 16% in June. (Performance Results (MR-7C)). Region-wide, Qwest's performance on this measure has been out of parity for each of the last 12 months. (Performance Measures, MR-7C) Qwest's performance was out of parity in Utah in three of the last four months, and two of four months in Washington. Qwest Comments at 46, 49. Although Qwest claims its performance was better when reports are excluded in which Qwest found no trouble, Qwest Comments at 46, 49 that is not the agreed upon measure. Qwest's determination

that there was no trouble on the line does not mean there was no trouble. Moreover, it is not clear that Qwest's unilateral exclusion applied to both retail and wholesale customers. In any event, repeat troubles have more impact on CLECs than on Qwest, as CLECs are for the first time trying to establish a reliable reputation in the market.

Billing

89. Until July 1, Qwest did not provide electronic CABS BOS billing for wholesale charges. CABS BOS is the industry standard billing format and is used by every other RBOC. Qwest instead has provided CRIS bills, which is the format used to provide retail bills. Pennsylvania Order ¶¶ 178-18. Although Qwest on July 1 announced that CABS BOS bills are now available, there has been no third party test of those bills and no experience to show those bills are ready. The Department of Justice properly emphasized that the CABS BOS bills for which BellSouth provided a test file on July 1 have been implemented too recently to enable BellSouth to use them as a basis to claim it has auditable electronic bills. DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 23.

90. Use of CRIS bills has required WorldCom to design unique billing systems. This is particularly difficult because CRIS varies tremendously from ILEC to ILEC and even across states within an ILEC. Qwest has three different billing centers that provide WorldCom with CRIS bills just in the states WorldCom has already entered. Each of these has different levels of detail on its bills. The ILECs also may change the format of CRIS without prior notification; whereas, the industry has two CABS releases per year, with a standard notification process. WorldCom has also faced data mapping issues with Qwest bills, such as transmission of duplicative detail information for directory assistance

and expanded area service, and transmission of consolidated summary information and detail information in two separate files that have to be combined in order to balance the summary and detail information.

91. Moreover, the CABS BOS format is needed to ensure that CLECs can effectively audit their bills. Not only does the non-standard nature of CRIS make auditing difficult, but the CRIS bills also lack necessary detail information. The ability to audit monthly recurring bills is completely dependent on the receipt of USOC level detail on the bills. Yet of the three Qwest billing centers, only one can send the complete USOC detail on CRIS bills. The second can send some limited USOC detail, and the third an send no USOC detail at all. Other important details are not included either. Service Address and Adjustment detail are not sent by any of the Qwest billing centers.

92. Qwest says that its CRIS bills are auditable. Qwest states that its CRIS bills provide individual bill detail for each end-users' account, as well as summary information. Qwest July 10 *ex parte* letter, Tab 1 at 2-3. But read carefully, Qwest does not say that its CRIS bills contain the USOCs for recurring charges that Qwest itself acknowledges are "important for bill validation." *Id.* at 4. Qwest says that these are provided on the BOS bills but not on the CRIS bills. Qwest also does not dispute that it fails to provide service address and adjustment detail on the CRIS bills. Without the USOCs and other detail information, electronic auditing cannot be complete. Moreover, the non-standard nature of CRIS causes significant problems especially since Qwest's CRIS bills vary in each of its three regional centers.

93. Every other ILEC provides wholesale bills in CABS format. Yet Qwest did not do so until July 1 even though AT&T has been requesting CABS billing from Qwest since

1996 and WorldCom has been requesting CABS as well. AT&T submitted a change request for CABS billing on September 6, 2001.

94. Because of Qwest's delay, there will be no way to know whether Qwest's deployment of CABS has been successful in time for the Commission to rule on Qwest's section 271 application. As this Commission is well aware from its discussion of billing problems that arose in Pennsylvania, successful deployment of CABS BOS billing can take many months. Pennsylvania Order ¶ 19.

95. It is particularly important that Qwest provide accurate, auditable CABS BOS bills since even with the limited auditing WorldCom has been able to conduct to date, it has hundreds of thousands of outstanding billing disputes open with Qwest. KPMG also found numerous errors on bills. 20.7-1-3. Although the last bill it received was correct, KPMG was unable to conclude that Qwest has in place an internal process for validating bill accuracy. KPMG was unable to determine whether Qwest complied with cycle balancing procedures to resolve out-of-balance conditions (Final Test 20.7-1-3) *or* whether Qwest had sufficient reasonability checks to identify errors not susceptible to pre-determined balancing procedures. Final Test 20.7-1-4. KPMG was also unable to determine whether Qwest had procedures to ensure that payments and adjustments are applied when errors are identified (Final Test 20.7-1-5). And KPMG was unable to determine whether Qwest ensures that bills are retained for a sufficient length of time so that CLECs can challenge them. (Final Test 20.7-1-9). Because Qwest has not shown that it has processes in place to ensure it produces accurate bills, Qwest's present failure to provide auditable bills in CABS BOS format is an especially severe deficiency.

Change Management

96. Qwest recently implemented a new change management process. Much of that process was not put in place until April 2002. That process has not yet been tested. Thus, even though the process has been significantly improved, there is no way yet to know that it works. Qwest has not yet "demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan." Ga/La Order ¶ 179.

97. The ROC test did not determine that Qwest's change management process was adequate. Indeed, the change management process was still being designed at the time that KPMG performed its testing. As a result, of the 18 change management components that KPMG did test, it was unable to determine compliance for 7 of them. It was unable to determine whether procedures and systems are in place to track descriptions of proposed changes, key notification dates and changes in status (Final Test 23-1-7, 23-2-7); whether criteria were defined for the prioritization process and for coding the severity of defects (Final Test 23-1-8. 23-2-8), whether Qwest complies with notification intervals and documentation release requirements (Final Test 23-1-9. 23-2-9), and whether the change management process as a whole is in place and documented (Final Test 23-2-2).

98. Qwest's ability to adhere to its new process and, for example, transmit documentation sufficiently in advance of a release and implement a release with few defects, is questionable in light of Qwest's prior failure to adhere to its change management process. KPMG closed/unresolved E3094 on the basis that Qwest originally did not adhere to its established change management process for notifying CLECs about a proposed process change, and allowing input from all interested parties, and that there had been no final adoption of a new process so no chance to observe whether the ad hoc process agreed upon would work (related to Final Test criteria 23-2, 23-3, 23-8). KPMG also

closed/inconclusive E3110 because it could not yet determine whether Qwest adhered to its new process for tracking and verifying adherence to the documentation release intervals (related to Final Test criteria 23-7 and 23-9). KPMG closed as inconclusive Exception 3111 because, while Qwest had agreed to a new process for prioritizing changes, there are several areas where the new prioritization and packaging process was either not completely established prior to Release 10.0. the last release observed by KPMG, and other areas in which it was not followed (related to Final Test criteria 23-3, 23-8). Finally, KPMG closed as inconclusive Test Criterion 23-9, noting that Qwest had failed in some instances to comply with intervals for providing documentation and KPMG had not been able to observe whether Qwest complied with newly adopted intervals.

99. Cap Gemini Ernst & Young's review of Qwest's new change management process in Arizona also found that Qwest had not yet demonstrated a pattern of compliance on some key aspects of change management even though Cap Gemini ultimately passed Qwest with respect to change management. CGE&Y noted, for example, that Qwest had made process changes to address issues concerning prioritization of change requests, the length of time for a request even to make it to the prioritization stage, and the length of time in advance by which documentation would be released. But CGE&Y also noted that there appeared to be some issues with implementation of these new processes in limited observations and that in one case CGE&Y had not had any chance to observe compliance not yet demonstrated a pattern of compliance. Ex. DLF-CMP-8 at 42 (attached to Change Mangement Declaration). In addition, the Joint CLEC Brief Regarding Qwest's Change Management Process, which is attached to Ex. DLF-CMP-10 in Qwest's, Qwest I filing,

provides recent examples of non-compliance with the new change management procedures.

100. Of particular concern as we move forward is whether Qwest is able to implement important CLEC-prioritized changes. Given Qwest's current schedule of 3 major releases per year, and the rate at which it implements prioritized changes in each release, it appears that Qwest will ever implement only about 50% of prioritized changes. If so, this will be a real problem, as WorldCom has explained at length during the BellSouth Georgia/Louisiana proceedings.

101. Qwest has made important progress in moving towards an acceptable change management process. But it is not yet known that Qwest will implement that process successfully.

Qwest Lacks an Independent Test Environment

102. Qwest does not have an independent test environment that mirrors production. As the Commission recently explained, "[a] stable testing environment that mirrors the production environment and is physically separate from it is a fundamental part of a change management process ensuring that competing carriers are capable of interacting smoothly and effectively with a BOC's OSS, especially in adapting to interface upgrades." Ga/La Order ¶187.

103. Qwest's original test environment, the Interoperability environment, is not a physically separate environment. Rather it is simply the production environment with special flags for test orders, as KPMG explained in the June 20 ROC meeting with staff. In KPMG's view as expressed in the meeting, Interoperability therefore fails one of the primary criterion for a test environment. There is a significant risk that test orders and

production orders will become intermingled in this environment. HP explained that Qwest informed it that it "has not yet developed the means to ensure that test transactions executed in interoperability will not impact live accounts. . . . Qwest's concern is reasonable, as HP has experienced adverse impacts to live accounts when utilizing Qwest's Interoperability Testing process." LN OSS-83 at 7.

104. Moreover, CLECs can only test in Interoperability if they have real customers who allow them to submit test orders. They cannot use special test accounts as they need to do when testing a new version of an interface. As HP explained, Interoperability Testing "requires that the CLECs use valid account data of live customers for testing purposes, since all transactions are edited against production and legacy systems. This practice is costly, time consuming, and inconvenient for both CLECs and their customers. HP also observed instances in which customer accounts were inadvertently changed." LN- OSS-83 at 6-7.

105. In addition, post-order responses in the Interoperability Environment are generated by Qwest technical personnel. In this important sense, despite overlapping significantly with the production environment, Interoperability is substantially different from production and does not provide an adequate test of what CLECs can expect from production.

106. Qwest's new environment, SATE, although independent, is also currently inadequate. SATE does not mirror production, as KPMG found. Exception 3095, 3077 (related to test criteria 24.6-1-8). KPMG's first criticism focused on the fact that SATE does not enable CLECs to test all products that Qwest offers. Exception 3095. Although Qwest claims that this was the choice of CLECs, that is so only because the alternative

presented by Qwest was even worse. Qwest presented CLECs with the choice either of limiting the functionality included in SATE or of foregoing development of other functionality important to CLECs. In Exception 3095, KPMG found Qwest's response regarding prioritization to be inadequate. Moreover, even Qwest acknowledges that CLECs placed high priority on inclusion of some additional products to SATE, Notarianni & Doherty Decl. ¶¶ 757-58. In particular, CLECs submitted change requests asking that 10 additional products be coded into SATE, yet Qwest has yet to include those products. Some of these change requests have been outstanding for 7 months or more.

107. More important, however, even for those products that CLECs can test, SATE does not match production – despite Qwest's assertions to the contrary in the June 20 meeting with staff. KPMG noted that the response times in SATE do not match production, that the detail received on a production response such as a FOC or a completion notice may not match production, which "is another indication that the testing environment does not provide CLECs with an accurate depiction of production capabilities," that SATE also fails to mirror production because it does not transmit the transaction response expected in the real world and CLECs must select predetermined paths in order to receive responses automatically, and that the data in SATE do not match data in production. Exception 3077 2nd Supplemental Recommendation 4/3/2002 (related to Final Test criterion 24.6-1-8). In its final disposition report for Exception 3077, KPMG specifically concluded that the "data contained within the order responses is not consistent, and may not mirror the data that would be found in production responses." Exception 3077 Disposition Report. KPMG added that even where Qwest

had documented the differences between SATE and production, "documentation of known differences does not substitute for a test environment that mirrors the transactional behavior of the production environment."

108. Unlike KPMG, HP ultimately concluded in Arizona that SATE was adequate. Nonetheless, it found "noteworthy discrepancies related to business rules consistency between the SATE and production systems." LN OSS-83 at 9. Indeed, HP's evaluation resulted in a number of negative or inconclusive findings. For example, HP issued negative or inconclusive findings because SATE did not satisfactorily capture errors caused by data entry mistakes, did not employ business rule edits provided in the documentation, did not provide the error messages expected in production, had a significant variance from expected production responses, and did not successfully update all expected error messages with introduction of a new release. LN OSS-83 at 34-42. HP also found that "much of the documentation . . .was newly developed and required additional support from Qwest SATE personnel to allow HP to properly use the SATE environment. SATE documentation contained numerous minor inaccuracies that HP believes are the result of hasty preparation and poor version control." LN OSS-83 at 15, 20-21.

109. CLEC experience also demonstrates that SATE does not mirror production. For example, in SATE, when a pre-order inquiry is sent that contains a thoroughfare such as "DRIVE" and the proper designation is "DR," Qwest will respond that there is no match. In production, however, Qwest will respond that there is a near match or an exact match. E-mail from Mark Powell of Accenture, 5/9/2002. When Accenture, which designed the software for Z-Tel, pointed this out to Qwest, Qwest responded, "[a]t this point we do not

have the ability to support this level of comparison logic in SATE. Our production backend systems do. We are currently investigating some different options. The answer to Mike's question is that behavior is specific to SATE and you should not expect to see this in production." E-mail from Michael McCallister, 5/14/2002.

110. Similarly, Qwest here acknowledges there are differences between SATE and the production environment. It states that "all *known* differences between production and SATE are noted, published, and discussed with CLECs." Qwest Comments at 149. It also acknowledges that error messages are different in SATE and production. *Id.*

111. In its *ex parte* filings in the Qwest I proceeding, Qwest acknowledges an approximately 22% variance in the error messages coded into SATE with those in production. July 15 *ex parte* at 2. Qwest includes a long list of error responses that differ between SATE and production. Qwest July 10 *ex parte* letter, at Tab 14. Among the error messages missing in SATE are common errors such as "No exact match was found for the address provided….Multiple addresses were found for the address"; "Unable to Validate Address"; and "Due date requested has passed." Qwest states that "by coding a relatively small percentage of possible error messages into SATE, CLECs are able to test their ability to process 100 percent of the possible error messages they would receive in production." Notarianni & Doherty Decl. ¶¶ 722. But this makes no sense. The messages generated electronically should always be the same in production and testing – and, ideally, any manual responses should also be identical for the same type of order, whether in production or testing. As for Qwest's statement that it has documented differences between SATE and production, even if this is so it would be insufficient, as KPMG concluded: "KPMG Consulting maintains its position that test environment

transaction responses should mirror those from the corresponding production environment." Exception 3077. If CLECs receive a different message in the test environment than is expected in production, they are not assured of what the response will be in production. They are not assured either that their code or Qwest's code is working properly. Moreover, the error responses are not all that differs, as the address example I provided above demonstrates.

112. The differences between SATE and production are likely even more substantial that Qwest acknowledges, as CLECs have had little time to use SATE since its implementation to determine what problems exist with SATE. But it is already clear that SATE does not mirror production in important respects, making it difficult for CLECs to rely on SATE as a basis for evaluating a new version of an interface. When CLECs receive a response in SATE, they have no way of knowing whether they will receive the same response in production and whether they should revise their systems, ask Qwest to revise its systems, or conclude that there is no need for any changes.

113. The DOJ relied on this Commission's prior Orders to conclude that a test environment does not have to be identical to production. DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 29. But the Commission's prior conclusions on this point indicated that a test environment did not have to mirror flow-through or response times of production. The Commission did not conclude that it was acceptable for a BOC to establish a test environment in which CLECs received different responses than they would receive in production. This significantly undermines the significance of any results obtained during testing.

114. The DOJ also relies on the fact that SATE's accuracy has been close to the benchmark of 95 percent compliance with documentation and business rules. DOJ Qwest

I Eval. at 30. Even if this is so, however, this does not show that SATE is adequate. Depending on what the business rules and documentation say, SATE could be 100% compliant with the business rules and documentation, yet yield completely different results than the production environment. As the DOJ notes, Qwest does not yet measure the extent to which SATE mirrors real-world production results. DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 30. As DOJ says, this is a "large, unresolved concern." DOJ Qwest I Eval. at 30. It is vital that SATE mirror production, and until it does, Qwest should not be authorized to provide long distance service.

CONCLUSION

This concludes my declaration on behalf of WorldCom.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Sherry Lichtenberg

Executed on: August 1, 2002